2018

The Mechanical World

The aim of this book is to develop a metaphysical account of mechanisms. So far, the new mechanistic literature has mainly focused on epistemic issues such as scientific explanation, scientific discovery, and causal modelling. This book takes a difference stance: I will investigate in which sense mechanisms are things in the world; what our ontology has to look like in order for mechanisms to exist, and its implications for causation, levels, and part–whole relations; and how metaphysics and scientific explanation relate to each other. I will discuss whether the metaphysics of mechanisms is reductionist, and whether it leaves room for the causal efficacy of higher-level phenomena. Finally, I hope to provide a starting point for new projects on issues in the philosophy of mind, such as non-reductive physicalism as a solution to the mind–body problem.

Artikel

Gutachtertätigkeit

Year
peer reviewed
Author
Title
Publisher
accepted
no
Krickel, B.
Epiphänomenalismus
in: Hoffmann-Kolss, V. (ed.), Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes, Metzler Verlag
Link
2021
yes
Kohár, M., Krickel, B.
Contrast and Compare: How to choose the relevant details for a mechanistic explanation
in: F. Calzavarini, M., Viola (eds.) Neural Mechanisms - New Challenges in the Philosophy of Neuroscience, Springer
Link
2020
yes (internal)
Krickel, B.
Reply to Cartwright, Pemberton, Wieten: “Mechanisms, laws and explanation”
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Link
2020
yes
Krickel, B.
Extended Cognition, The New Mechanists’ Mutual Manipulability Criterion, and The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness
Mind & Language
Link
2020
yes
Baumgartner, M., Casini, L., Krickel, B.
Horizontal Surgicality and Mechanistic Constitution
Erkenntnis
Link
2019
no
Krickel, B., Newen, A.
DFG-Graduiertenkolleg 2185 “Situierte Kognition"
Neuroforum
Link
2019
yes
Craver, C., Krickel, B.
Mechanisms in Science
Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy
Link
2018
yes
Krickel, B.
A Regularist Approach to Mechanistic Type-Level Explanation
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Link
2018
yes
Krickel, B.
Saving the Mutual Manipulability Account of Constitutive Relevance
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Link
2018
yes
Krickel, B.
Are the States Underlying Implicit Biases Unconscious? - A Neo-Freudian Answer
Philosophical Psychology
Link
2017
yes
Krickel, B.
Making Sense of Interlevel Causation in Mechanisms from a Metaphysical Perspective
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
Link
2017
yes
Kaiser, M., Krickel, B.
The Metaphysics of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Link
2010
no
Krickel, B., Reutlinger, A.
Searle on Mental Causation. Biological Naturalism, or something near enough
in: Franken, D., Karakus, A., Michel, J. (Hrsg.), Münstersche Vorlesungen zur Philosophie: John R. Searle - Thinking About the Real World, Ontos Verlag.
Link